- August 16, 2024
- Posted by: admin
- Category: Emilio Cozzi
The first devices of the Qianfan, “thousands of sails,” have been launched and are set to take the orbital route, giving Beijing a global network following in the footsteps of Starlink.
BY EMILIO COZZI
China is now in the game. Beijing has begun constructing its own G60 constellation for satellite connectivity. Rather than a direct challenge to Starlink, it’s more about keeping pace. On August 6, at 11:42 local time, the Long March 6A rocket launched from the Taiyuan Space Center, delivering 18 satellites that will soon form a mega-constellation of antennas, also known as G60, or “Qianfan,” which translates to “thousands of sails”—14,000 to be precise, according to current plans.
Faced with Western efforts, China could not stand idly by. In fact, two constellations for low-Earth orbit internet services are in the works. The first to launch is from Shanghai Spacecom Satellite Technology (Ssst), also known as the “Spacesail Constellation.” The devices launched on August 6 are the inaugural batch of the first generation of “spacesail” satellites, which, according to the Chinese news agency Xinhua, “will provide global users with ultra-reliable, low-latency, high-speed broadband internet services.”
The first G60 satellite rolled off the production line in December 2023 at Gesi Aerospace Technology in the Songjiang district. The program is the result of an investment by the Shanghai government, along with the Chinese Academy of Sciences, in a region, the Yangtze River Delta, aiming to become the hub of the country’s space technology, with the production of satellites, launchers, services, and infrastructure. According to information released during the public presentation of the new factory, 108 satellites are scheduled to be launched throughout 2024; once fully operational, the plant will be able to produce three hundred per year. It’s a start, but it may not be enough to compete with Starlink.
The Race Against SpaceX
Five years after the start of its constellation’s deployment, Elon Musk’s company has put over 6,000 operational satellites into orbit (with permits to reach up to 42,000). At the pace declared by Ssst, it would take two decades to reach such numbers. Nonetheless, the path is set: the other Chinese constellation with similar objectives is Guowang (“national network”), supported by the central government and owned by the state company SatNet. It will consist of 13,000 satellites. However, the fate of Guowang remains uncertain.
In an interesting analysis from last year on China’s intentions, the British think tank Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) highlighted several reasons why this move is advantageous: first and foremost, it’s the right time to act, to avoid letting Starlink “run away” while the market is still competitive and orbits are relatively uncongested. After the U.S. (and with Amazon’s Kuiper expected to add another 3,200 devices), the only other major operational constellation is OneWeb by Eutelsat, recently saved from bankruptcy with help from the UK government, which, however, has “only” 650 satellites.
A Global Interest
China’s offer to “global users” places it in a market where there are no physical boundaries. Satellites in polar orbit can cover virtually any place on Earth, and electromagnetic waves cross borders without customs checks. It’s hard to say whether the Chinese connection service, if cheaper, could succeed in Western countries. What is certain is that it will carry political weight in shaping global balances or in the outcome of conflicts where Starlink is currently the dominant player. The reference to the war in Ukraine is clear, where Musk—a private individual—has in a sense become an arbiter of the conflict, deciding to provide connectivity to the resisting army but refusing its use to support drones targeting Crimea. The close relationship between Russia and China has been reinforced in recent years, and it is not out of the question that a high-speed satellite connection offered to Moscow in Donbass could alter outcomes on the battlefield, though it’s currently impossible to verify the strength of this hypothesis.
It’s easier to consider such a pervasive orbital infrastructure as a tool of influence in regions dependent on China. As noted by Juliana Suess in the aforementioned RUSI analysis, Starlink is global but not used everywhere. Several African states, already in business with Beijing, are waiting for the People’s Republic to offer a connection service to their citizens and institutions, particularly in areas without terrestrial antennas and in remote, underserved regions. Several nations in Africa and Southeast Asia are still disconnected because they haven’t approved regulations governing the service. This context may give China an easier path, thanks to the long-standing investments in resource-rich but still impoverished countries. Many in the West view this approach as neo-colonial, but it’s proving effective for Beijing.
Defense and Aggression
The geopolitical importance of owning a satellite internet constellation is evident, both economically and strategically, on multiple fronts: primarily domestic, for a market where demand is expected to grow, and whose significance is unique. The situation in Ukraine shows how vital it is to have resilient networks in case of infrastructure attacks. It’s no coincidence that Taiwan, considering the increasing threat of invasion from China, is planning its own satellite constellation. It’s also no secret that Iris2, the network funded by the European Commission (though its future is still uncertain), is an asset designed to make the Union independent of third-party infrastructures (primarily American). The eastern front tensions, where the conflict sparked by Ukraine’s invasion could spread to NATO countries supporting Kyiv’s resistance, add to this. Concerns over natural disasters also weigh heavily, particularly earthquakes and the increasingly frequent and severe effects of climate change. It’s a matter of sovereignty in every possible sense.
On the external front, however, it’s a matter of power: China cannot allow the monopoly of strategic technologies and infrastructures to remain in the hands of competitors or potential enemies. From this perspective, space—viewed as exploitable “volume”—should be seen as a resource, specifically a finite one. If all the devices planned for all currently active and projected constellations were combined, the total would easily exceed 100,000.
This raises a complex question: is there really space up there for everyone? It’s an open issue, poised to turn orbit into the next battleground.