The U.S. Space Force Aims for Space Superiority

A new document from the military branch outlines its approach to orbital dominance and does not rule out offensive actions

BY EMILIO COZZI

Until now, it was little more than a hypothesis: space warfare was a scenario partly attributable to cinematic storytelling, to scenes from Star Wars, Battlestar Galactica, and similar films.

What Nato expressed in 2019, the identification of space as a new “operational domain,” meaning a plausible theater of conflict, was, indeed, a concept.

Today, however, the United States Space Force (or Ussf), the branch of the U.S. armed forces created by Donald Trump also in 2019, has made things clear in a new strategic document titled “Space Warfighting: A Framework for Planners.”
It is the manifesto of a turning point. It states, in black and white, that space must be dominated.
Far from being a declaration of war, it nonetheless strongly resembles a claim of sovereignty: anyone who hinders U.S. (and allied) operations in orbit will be targeted.

From Deterrence to Domination: “Space Superiority” as a Goal

The declared objective is space superiority, an operational condition that allows the United States to have freedom of action in orbit while denying it to adversaries: it is “the degree of dominance that allows the United States and its allies to conduct operations without effective interference, while denying the same freedom to adversaries.” It is a definition, a doctrine of superiority, guaranteed through the use of force.
It marks a clear shift in approach, further emphasized by a change in tone in official communications, using textbook military language: “warfighting,” “offensive space control,” “targeting,” “combat power.”

“We have a new administration that pushed us to focus on this issue,” said Space Force Lieutenant General Shawn Bratton to reporters. “We have a Secretary of Defense very interested in the ethics of warfare and lethality, and naturally, we are progressing to the point where we are moving beyond the concept of ‘protect and defend,’ and yes, we are talking about offensive capabilities in space.”

Attack and Defense

In fact, the document distinguishes between Offensive Space Control (Osc) and Defensive Space Control (Dsc).
“Offensive space control” includes activities aimed at degrading, disrupting, denying, or destroying the adversary’s space capabilities. It outlines three types of operations: first, orbital attack, which involves aggression “to destroy, disrupt, or degrade enemy space platforms in the space domain.” This can be carried out using interceptors either through rendezvous in orbit or ground-based, with the tactic of pursuit, targeting an enemy satellite with an anti-satellite (Asat) projectile; or with standoff attacks, such as those using laser weapons.
The second action is the interdiction of space links, which aims to cut the umbilical cord connecting the adversary’s satellites to control systems. This is one of the “non-kinetic” systems, to be implemented with electromagnetic attacks, such as radio interference (jamming) or cyberattacks.
The third action considered is the terrestrial offensive, directed at stations and launch infrastructures, both on land and at sea, as well as antennas and mission control centers. It can be carried out by aircraft, ground, maritime, or space bases.
Defensive control, on the other hand, aims to protect friendly space resources. Passive measures are implemented by strengthening satellite resilience, distributing functions over network architectures, and relying on maneuverable platforms capable of avoiding threats (from debris to enemy Asat systems). Active measures employ the same tactics as offensive actions, with a somewhat blurry line between prevention and attack.
What marks a significant shift is the availability and readiness to use offensive capabilities. It’s no longer just about “resisting” or “surviving,” but, if necessary, striking first.

The Central Role of Space in Multi-Domain Warfare

“Winning” in space is a goal that, in a boundary-less environment, carries very different meanings compared to the battlefield. In the long term, it means maintaining a competitive advantage over capable and determined adversaries like China and Russia.
The key is adaptability, integrated into a multi-domain strategy that connects space to cyber, electronic warfare, and ground, air, and maritime forces. The Space Force positions itself as the central node of this network, providing information, positioning, targeting, and communications to all components of the Joint Force. Not coincidentally, the operators of the Space Force are called “guardians.”
“Space superiority is not only a necessary prerequisite for the success of the Joint Force, but also something we must be ready to fight for. Once obtained and maintained, it unlocks superiority in other domains, fuels coalition lethality, and strengthens the survival of our troops. It is, therefore, the foundation from which the Joint Force projects power, deters aggression, and protects the homeland,” writes General Chance Saltzman, the Chief of Space Operations, in his introduction to the document.
In this vision, space constitutes the “sensory node” of the entire U.S. military apparatus: “We feel the weight of it,” said Bratton. “It’s not just about fighting in space and seeing who wins the battle. We will fight in space to ensure that one of our aircraft carriers isn’t hit, and that 5,000 sailors don’t end up at the bottom of the ocean.” It’s “joint lethality across all domains,” the report emphasizes, highlighting the importance of the cyber component for both defense and attack.

Space Domain Awareness: Eyes and Ears in Orbit

To act effectively in a wartime scenario, it’s essential to know where everyone is: allies, enemies, and unidentified objects. This is where the pillar of Space Domain Awareness (Sda) comes into play, the ability to monitor, track, identify, attribute behaviors and intentions in space.

The United States is developing global networks of ground-based sensors, phased-array radars, space telescopes, and artificial intelligence to monitor every cubic inch of usable orbit, from the lowest altitudes to geostationary orbit. The goal is to assign responsibility with certainty, anticipate threats, and react before any damage is done.
SDA is not just “situational awareness”; it is a key element of deterrence. Knowing that every move will be seen, tracked, understood, and potentially countered is already a deterrent.

In Space, a New Cold War?

Strategic presence now takes place in a borderless region, where allies and enemies orbit together. From the standpoint of provocations, this makes everything much more uncertain. Space is contested, and it will become increasingly crowded, sought-after, and militarized. The new framework of the U.S. Space Force affirms that we have entered the era of space warfare, where orbital superiority is considered as strategic as air or nuclear superiority.
Competition with China and Russia, both actively engaged in developing anti-satellite capabilities, is seen as systemic and long-term. As many analysts point out, the risk is that deterrence may give way to provocation. But for Washington, there is no alternative: peace in space is ensured through strategic positioning. Deterrence comes from the threat of the use of force.
Just like during the Cold War.