European Space Defense. Esa: “We Are the Instrument”

The continental agency cannot have military purposes, but it receives a “political mandate” from the Eu Commission to provide the orbital infrastructure necessary for armies and border security operations.

BY EMILIO COZZI AND MATTEO MARINI

In the midst of the worst continental, perhaps global, crisis since the Second World War, Europe looked in the mirror and became aware of its own vulnerabilities.
The lack of interest in the affairs of the Old Continent shown by the Trump Administration, which shifted the geopolitical focus to the Indo Pacific, exposed the weaknesses of European defense and its space system. First of all because Europe does not have a common defense. And space is no exception. It is therefore necessary to prepare, and quickly.
For this reason, the Europe of Defense calls and the European Space Agency, with an unprecedented vigor on these issues, responds as a security provider.

This all happens in the wake of incidents that seem to indicate an escalation: first, an alleged jamming of the satellite positioning system of the plane of the President of the European Commission, Ursula Von Der Leyen, on her way to Bulgaria, which had to resort to manual navigation; then the report by the Estonian government of a violation of its airspace by three Russian MiG 31 jets. Immediately after, incursions by drones of as yet unidentified origin over the skies of Poland and Romania.

The bastions are in orbit

Being able to rely on space infrastructures, communication satellites, positioning, navigation, and Earth observation has become essential to face threats, if not actual acts of aggression, that cross the borders of a united Europe or Nato.
Europe, however, has fallen behind in this area. It has therefore become necessary to develop, in record time, a system of systems “for geointelligence data from space with imaging capabilities in all weather conditions, to revisit a precise point on Earth every thirty minutes; secure satellite communications better than Starlink; high precision and secure positioning and timing services for navigation, able to resist jamming and spoofing,” said the European Commissioner for Defense and Space, Andrius Kubilius, in his speech at the Esa Council in June, later reiterating it during his address in September at the General States on Defense, Space, and Cybersecurity. “We are the tool,” replied the Director General of the European Space Agency, the Austrian Josef Aschbacher.

“In the European Union, we are already under attack because of spoofing of global satellite navigation systems, which I experienced firsthand when, together with the President of the Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, we were traveling to Bulgaria,” Kubilius recalled during the September event held at the Esa center in Frascati. “In the Baltic, the region I know well, radio frequency interference is five times higher than last year. But it is not only the Baltic; much of Europe is at risk. In short, space is not decisive only on the battlefield; space is becoming a battlefield.”

The new role of Esa

In other words, a somewhat unprecedented path is opening in the forty year history of the European Space Agency. Our armed forces need autonomous space systems, robust positioning, navigation, and timing to guide aircraft, drones, and missiles, for secure communications of our armed forces in the air, at sea, and on land, and to preserve and modernize our existing systems in order to strengthen our global leadership in space for defense, stated the European Commissioner. Esa, which owns and coordinates the core of the Continent’s technical and logistical engineering excellence, must therefore collaborate in the defense of Europe. Note the use, in this case by the author, of the lowercase d. It should be understood in a broad, general sense.

Esa, in fact, cannot take part in Defense in the institutional sense of the term. The Agency is a civilian body, and the convention that established it, signed in 1975, reiterates four times that its purposes are exclusively peaceful. Nevertheless, the Director General has decided to operate along a blurred or dual boundary, following the example of the program that has so far provided the greatest lessons in this field: Galileo, the European system for geopositioning, navigation, and timing.

The Agency is the tool

Hosting the European General States on Defense, Space, and Cybersecurity at a most delicate moment, Aschbacher wanted to respond personally in front of ministers, commissioners, and governments with these words: “The President of the Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, said in her State of the Union speech two days ago: ‘We must invest in real time space surveillance so that no movement of forces goes unnoticed.’ Words that could not be more timely, given the intrusion of Russian drones into sovereign Polish territory just a few days ago. But the Commission and Europe are fortunate that Esa, together with the European Commission, is already working on this: building a real time space surveillance system, of course with the Member States.”

Esa’s response to Europe’s needs is, in short, present: “The Agency is Europe’s tool as architect and developer of complex space systems, with unmatched technical know how and unique operational management capabilities.”

A political mandate for Esa

Aschbacher then delves into the most delicate issue, also politically, because it is very close to the boundary between what can be considered peaceful and what no longer is: “We must raise the level of our engagement in space and defense. This is indisputable, but it requires courageous political decisions. Esa is not a security actor, but it is without a doubt a security provider: a fine but crucial line. It will never operate intelligence satellites, but it can provide space infrastructures to designated operators, as it already does with Galileo.” It is important to reiterate: Galileo is not a system operated by Esa, but financed by the European Commission, it was built under the Agency’s guidance on behalf of the Union. Conceived as civilian, it is de facto dual. The positioning and navigation signal, in fact, is valuable for armies and governments. The new system to encrypt the signal will, in the coming months, provide an additional security guarantee for the support infrastructure for governments and contingents around the world.

“We can produce these space capabilities, as we did when, together with the European Space Agency, we created the Galileo and Copernicus systems, global leaders,” Kubilius emphasized again. “A new governmental Earth observation system will be needed for our ability to have geointelligence data at very high resolution and with a very high revisit rate. Up to thirty minutes, instead of only once a day, or less, as is the case today.”

Kubilius also mentioned other capabilities that Europe must strengthen: autonomous space transport (the current capacity with Vega C and Ariane 6 is evidently not considered sufficient); permanent maintenance of satellites directly in orbit, the so called in orbit servicing; the ability to react to and defend satellites from any physical threat in space; monitoring of radio frequency interference.

“The Commission will quickly conclude this first phase with the preparation of a high level user requirements document. It will summarize the work done in recent years. It will be discussed and agreed with the Member States,” said Kubilius in June. “We expect it will be ready in the autumn and will constitute a political mandate for Esa.”

The question at this point is legitimate: will Esa be the glue for a first real European Defense?