Space Bill, Starlink, and the “Industrial Return” to Connect Italy (and Europe)

The amendments on national security and the contracts for our country in light of the rearmament plan signed by Von Der Leyen.

BY EMILIO COZZI

It’s worth noting: the Space Bill approved by the Chamber of Deputies in early March and now under review by the Senate has changed compared to the first version from June 2024. This is significant because it delves into matters concerning both the future of our country’s space economy and the security of Italy and Europe.

On these pages, we had written about the proposal shortly after it was issued by the Council of Ministers, at the beginning of last summer. In brief, the Space Bill introduces a dedicated program and fund for the extra-atmospheric activities of companies, the first directive on public contracts for innovative SMEs and startups, in addition to a register of companies authorized to launch and operate in orbit, with the technical and economic requirements needed to obtain clearances.

It’s being discussed again today because the political debate has reignited over the same issue that stirred up strong reactions nine months ago: the guarantee of a ‘national transmission reserve’ (Article 25), that is, a satellite connectivity service capable of addressing internal security needs, national agencies, and institutions.

It’s important to note that any controversy related to defense is explicitly excluded by Article 28, which clarifies that the bill does not apply to space activities conducted by the Ministry of defense or security intelligence agencies. The same article includes a general safeguard clause that preserves the application of special powers (the so-called ‘golden power’) over assets in the defense and national security sectors, as well as for activities of strategic importance in the energy, transportation, and communications sectors.

Nevertheless, according to critics, as currently conceived, the law and specifically Article 25 would be an explicit concession to Elon Musk, whose Starlink constellation the government could potentially rely on.

The Battle of Amendments

As mentioned, however, the text passed by the Chamber of Deputies has undergone some changes in committee. Perhaps the most important of these concerns the contentious article, which now reads: ‘The Ministry of Enterprises and Made in Italy is responsible for the establishment of a national transmission capacity reserve through satellite communications, using, in order to ensure maximum diversification and national security, both satellites and constellations in geostationary, medium, and low orbits, managed exclusively by entities belonging to the European Union or the North Atlantic Alliance, also to ensure an adequate industrial return for the national system.’ The bolded parts are the amendments, i.e., additions to the original text. These are what upset Andrea Stroppa, Musk’s representative in Italy.

The amendments were presented by the Democratic Party and were also approved by the majority. Stroppa’s immediate reaction on X was blunt: ‘PD-FdI agreement. Good, now they want to portray Starlink and SpaceX (which, by the way, has launched missions for Italy speeding up timelines to help) as the bad guys. To the friends at FdI: don’t call us for conferences or anything else.’

Setting aside the heated exchanges, the national security requirement has been introduced, which should be important for politicians, given that the service is meant to convey sensitive and strategic information in the case of ‘critical situations,’ such as environmental disasters or incidents affecting land-based infrastructure.

The second amendment is also interesting, especially in how it developed: a first amendment, also signed by Democratic Party deputies, stated ‘and in any case providing for an adequate industrial return for the national system.’ In the final version, the word ‘and’ was replaced with ‘also,’ suggesting a softening of the previous urgency. ‘In any case’ means ‘in every way’ or ‘regardless,’ applied to the concept of industrial return, which is still not clearly defined, particularly in cases where a satellite connectivity service is purchased from a third country, whether the United States with Starlink or Europe with OneWeb.

Fewer Constraints, Starlink in the Lead

It is no coincidence that, when sifting through the amendments to the same article, proposals from Azione parliamentarians emerge, which were rejected, that sought to introduce even stricter conditions. The proposal suggested that the selection of the service should include: ‘a) compatibility, consistency, and integration with the commitments and programs Italy participates in at the European level; b) exclusive ownership and control of the encryption and software and hardware components used by the service provider.’ These requirements, it seems, would be incompatible with Starlink. However, it should be noted that owning and controlling the hardware also contradicts any other non-sovereign constellation.

An amendment was also rejected that would have required resorting to non-European entities only ‘in the case of proven unavailability’ of services provided ‘by institutional entities belonging to the European Union.’ In this case, one might think of a constellation like OneWeb, owned by Eutelsat, whose shares are held by an Indian private company but also by the French public bank and the UK government. This was a summary of the history of this article, which has been discussed and contentious, as the opposition considers it a ‘gift’ to Musk. However, in practice, the article does not exclude other players, such as Eutelsat with OneWeb.

It is worth remembering that Musk, by inventing Starlink, created the need to pursue a technology that today is unmatched in terms of performance and available infrastructure. In short: Can OneWeb be a substitute? It depends.

The Possibilities of OneWeb

It depends primarily on what is asked of OneWeb. In a series of international discussions, the company has positioned itself as an alternative to Starlink, for example in Ukraine and, in some cases, for military needs: ‘We are discussing with the EU how we can contribute to strengthening Ukraine’s efforts,’ a Eutelsat spokesperson told Reuters, noting that they also have geostationary satellite capacity suitable for certain local applications. ‘We are actively collaborating with European institutions and commercial partners to enable the rapid deployment of additional user terminals for critical missions and infrastructure,’ the spokesperson added, hinting at the possibility of offering the same capabilities as Starlink in terms of coverage and latency across Europe.

However, doubts remain: Musk’s currently operational satellites are around 7,000, compared to OneWeb’s 650. Even the declared latencies and bandwidths favor the U.S. mega-constellation, which is also cheaper and has more agile antennas, easier to move in an operational scenario. Where a lot of bandwidth is needed, such as for real-time video feeds.

Whether OneWeb can provide a sufficient service for Ukraine, or in similar situations, remains to be seen.

Before Iris2

It remains to be understood what the industrial returns of such an operation might be for Italy. Certainly, work will be needed to make the country self-sufficient, at least from the perspective of terrestrial infrastructure. Ground stations will be required, as well as the so-called “gateways” needed to connect satellites to the backbone, the core of the Internet network, which, at least for now, is firmly anchored to the ground.
It is not far-fetched to think that, for example, in the case of OneWeb, there could be an additional effort aimed at integrating the already launched constellation with new satellites, ready to densify it in the coming years.

The satellites in orbit were built by Airbus, which could, in the near future, form a new Space Alliance with Thales and Leonardo, a possibility suggested by the CEO of the Italian giant, Roberto Cingolani. Perhaps with the hope that from the 800 billion euros expected by Ursula Von Der Leyen, a credit line will emerge to build or strengthen the first European satellite constellation for connectivity. And even before Iris2, a project born late and which risks accumulating even more delays. A program, it should be noted, from which the largest European companies in the sector, such as Leonardo, Thales, and Airbus, have withdrawn, preferring to remain only as suppliers rather than taking on the business risk.