China’s space policy: (no longer so) slow and relentless

The Dragon is chasing the United States, but the gap seems to be narrowing: few mistakes, increased private sector involvement, and growing efforts to compete with SpaceX or win the lunar race.

BY EMILIO COZZI

In 2024, China was the second country for the number of space launches, behind the United States, as one might expect. It’s important to note, however, that this result was achieved without the firepower of SpaceX, which alone launched 89 rockets for its Starlink constellation, 21 more than Beijing, which stopped at 68.

There is, however, a detail to be uncovered in the statistics: Galactic Energy carried out five launches, Cas Space (state-funded but for commercial initiatives) conducted four, and Landspace, i-Space, and Orienspace each completed one launch.

These are all private or commercially-driven entities, and together, they represent more than a sixth of the total launches. The rest is made up of launches carried out by Casc, the leading state-owned company responsible for developing and building the Long March family of rockets, and by China Rocket, also state-owned.

Orbit, a Strategic Territory

The coldness of numbers, however, is not enough to account for China’s ambitions beyond the atmosphere. Much like the surveillance of sea channels, straits, and narrow passages, orbit has also become a domain for strategic positioning. For a simple reason: although vast, space – at least, its most coveted portion – is not infinite.

Once launched, any satellite becomes difficult or impossible to remove, unless drastic measures are taken, such as its destruction (which creates a dangerous cloud of debris) or relocation through very costly missions. Moreover, if the satellites belong to a competitor, an adversary, or a potential enemy, carrying out a threat would amount to an act of war.

SpaceX’s satellites already number in the thousands, and in a few years, they will reach tens of thousands. To be competitive, the only solution is to act quickly. This is something Beijing has understood for a long time.

It is no coincidence that China is building three satellite constellations for connectivity, totaling over 30,000 satellites, including the G60, Guowang, and Honghu-3. The latter will be launched into orbit by Landspace. As previously mentioned, China’s approach is to prevent the United States from monopolizing low Earth orbit, which is at risk of becoming saturated soon (with competitors including Amazon’s Kuiper and the satellite constellations currently being planned by India, Russia, and Europe).

Espionage and Surveillance: China’s Rise Concerns the U.S.

Despite its overexposure in recent news, the concern is not only about the response to Starlink; with greater access to orbit, the issue expands to all applications, particularly military ones.

Some time ago, General Stephen Whiting, head of the U.S. Space Command, told journalists that in just six years, Beijing has “tripled the number of surveillance and reconnaissance satellites in orbit,” with repercussions across all military sectors. “Frankly, the People’s Republic of China is moving at breathtaking speed in space and is rapidly developing a range of weapon systems capable of threatening our space capabilities.”

At nearly 70 years old, and with the necessary differences, Whiting’s words and the American concern echo the fears that animated the United States in 1957 when Sputnik first traversed orbital paths. The constant factor is that “on the other side” there is still a power with immense capabilities, and its lack of transparency makes it difficult to monitor its real economic commitment. What’s new is that China now has a population four times larger and a GDP second only to Washington’s.

The Race to the Moon

It’s unclear what China’s true objectives and the technologies it will use in the new “race to the Moon” are. What is known is that China is determined to send a human crew there by the beginning of the next decade, a goal similar to Nasa’s, especially considering the ongoing delays and setbacks of the Artemis program.

This new lunar venture could, in fact, lead to yet another head-to-head competition for territory in the same region of the Moon: the South Pole. Common sense would suggest that nations agree to a peaceful exploration activity based on mutual assistance and the sharing of scientific discoveries. The Artemis Accords, which have been signed by over 50 countries, mostly Western or under Washington’s umbrella, could serve as a good starting point for such cooperation. In response, China’s lunar enterprise, outlined in a series of memoranda for the creation of a scientific base on the lunar surface, has garnered support from Russia, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Switzerland, the UAE, Indonesia, Pakistan, Panama, and South Africa.

The impression, much like in 1957, is that the first to arrive could claim, occupy, and control a resource that, under the 1967 UN Outer Space Treaty, is declared a “global common good.” A definition that was specifically contested by the re-elected President Donald Trump in 2017 to stimulate the involvement of private companies in exploiting the riches of outer space.

In reality, however, China is the latest power to have gently set foot on the lunar surface with the most ambitious missions, proving it has the technology and know-how to land on the far side and bring back samples. China has never missed a shot on the Moon, and it’s hard to say what this might signal for the United States.

Power and Market

Ultimately, it is still the numbers that prove most revealing: satellites, of course, but also those concerning the power of launch vehicles.

As noted in another article, China is working on a “super” version of its Long March 9. It’s unclear how powerful it will be, but it’s expected to be comparable to SpaceX’s Starship. More generally, Beijing is designing various families of rockets to ensure rapid launch capabilities, with state-owned, commercial, or fully private vehicles. This brings us back to the starting point of this discussion.

China is accelerating a process that is now seen as essential: increasing private initiative in the space sector. Certainly, with many nuances, given the highly centralized and not exactly democratic nature of the government’s economic ecosystem.

In 2024, two new commercial launchers debuted: Gravity-1 from Orienspace and Zhuque-2E from Landspace. By 2025, seven Chinese commercial launchers will be ready for their first launch: those from Space Pioneer, Galactic Energy (2), Landspace, i-Space, Deep Blue Aerospace, and Space Epoch. For many of these companies, the focus is on the reusability of the first stage. While they are still trailing behind SpaceX’s achievements, China’s ecosystem of private companies and startups is strengthening. In terms of population, and alongside India, China represents the reality with the most significant growth potential in this sector.

If we consider that Deep Blue Aerospace has sold the first two tickets for a rocket ride that will take passengers into space in 2027 – the experience, a few minutes in microgravity, similar to Blue Origin’s offering, costs $211,000 – and that Cas Space plans to begin space tourism missions in a couple of years, the circle is, in some ways, closing.

China’s commercial intentions and ambitions cannot be confined to its domestic market. By definition, they are aimed at those who need to launch and have the money to do so. It will soon become clear whether the Asian giant will approach the market the way it has in other economic sectors and who its clients will be.

The instability of the global political scenario no longer guarantees that the West, especially Europe, will continue to follow the choices and policies of Donald Trump and Elon Musk.