Elon Musk, Starlink, and Europe

While the government is considering entrusting the critical and strategic communications of Defense to the megaconstellation, it is becoming clearer than ever how the Old Continent has failed to see the future.

BY EMILIO COZZI & MATTEO MARINI

Today, more than ever, it is clear how much Europe’s space sector is lagging behind. Not surprisingly, however, the harsh geopolitical reality comes as a slap in the face, certifying how the model followed so far has failed to place the Old Continent not at the forefront of innovation, but even in a secure position, far from the risk of technological dependence that is becoming more apparent by the day.

Not many years ago, among the managers of Europe’s most important industries and institutions, the commentary on the growing supremacy of SpaceX and the rocket reusability technologies that were starting to astonish the world was twofold: on one hand, it was argued that, to be sustainable, a Falcon 9 booster would need to be reused at least ten times. By 2025, many first stages have launched more than a dozen times and, in some cases, over twenty. Elon Musk has won the race.
The second objection, this one solid, was that, unlike European companies, SpaceX had substantial government contracts, both from Nasa and Defense. The issue for Europe was the lack of satellites and missions, and in general, the scarcity of customers to launch. In 2024, SpaceX rockets were involved in 134 launches. European rockets, just three. It is Europe that has lost the race.

It’s certainly worth noting that most of SpaceX’s launches serve to put its own satellites into orbit, those of the Starlink constellation. But it is also in this sense that the Pretoria tycoon has succeeded in winning this and many other “futuristic” challenges: he imagined something that didn’t exist, built it, and made it work. He pursued his goals: ultimately, to take humanity to Mars.

Meanwhile, he began occupying low Earth orbit and, taking advantage of the lack of strict and clear regulations on controlling those altitudes, built an unprecedented network beyond the sky: today, there are just under 7,000 Starlink satellites in orbit, and their numbers are steadily increasing. He then started selling his connection services worldwide, which he himself began acquiring, because, although not on par with terrestrial fiber, those services promise to reach anywhere.

For this reason, at a time when satellite connectivity is a strategic necessity, governments too must adapt or, in the case of European ones, position themselves and equip themselves.

The government’s step toward Starlink

The debate that has heated up the political scene in recent days stems from here: the government is exploring the possibility of acquiring Starlink’s service to connect diplomatic offices, government offices, and Italian contingents around the world. And to ensure support in case of emergencies or wartime scenarios.

The Prime Minister, Giorgia Meloni, during the New Year’s press conference, made it clear that this is an “exploratory phase,” a “normal dialogue with companies” offering services to the government. She then admitted not yet having “clear ideas” on the matter. This would involve entrusting a private citizen’s company, from a foreign, non-EU state, with managing sensitive information traffic crucial for our country’s security. The possibility is to rely on the world’s richest man, capable of influencing both the U.S. administration and wartime scenarios (in Ukraine, he once refused to provide connectivity for an operation Kyiv was about to carry out against a Russian ship). Moreover, he is ready to sponsor far-right political parties and publicly mock heads of state.

Regarding the protection of sensitive communications, the Ceo of Leonardo, Roberto Cingolani, recently expressed his view: there is no risk to the confidentiality of the data that would use the Starlink network, he said, because Italy has solid expertise in encryption.

The problem, if anything, will arise if Musk, with a contingent decision, were to decide to deny Italy access to the service. This is a possibility seriously considered by many critics and completely dismissed by others. In Ukraine, where it should be remembered that the conditions for using Starlink were quite different, Musk has already acted independently. For this reason, Pietro Batacchi, director of Rivista italiana Difesa, in an interview with Fondazione Leonardo, suggested that, when it comes to services for the government and Italian institutions, direct dialogue should be held with the Pentagon. In other words, guarantees are needed.

Unmatched Technology

Defense Minister Guido Crosetto highlighted in Parliament how the current technologies used by Italian contingents, particularly the Sicral satellites, have inferior performance compared to Starlink, both in terms of bandwidth and latency. The Sicral satellites are positioned in geostationary orbit, meaning they stay directly above the same point on Earth’s surface. They are located far, over 36,000 kilometers from Earth, which allows for broad coverage (almost an entire hemisphere), but the signal, needing to “bounce” over such a large distance, results in a noticeable latency (about 600 milliseconds), something Starlink satellites do not have. Having faster and more efficient military communications, especially in an operational scenario, can be crucial.

But why is this only being discussed now?

Because Musk, with Starlink, created a necessity. His megaconstellation has proven to be robust, resilient, and efficient. And today, it represents a strategic advantage. Given the geopolitical landscape, equipping oneself with infrastructure in line with the state of the art is a vital necessity.

Europe’s Shortsightedness

President Meloni pointed out another fact that helps close the loop: at the moment, Elon Musk’s constellation has no competitors. It has no public ones, nor private ones, despite the construction of other constellations (Amazon’s Kuiper) or already deployed ones (OneWeb). However, OneWeb, the largest of them, only has “650 satellites,” less than one-tenth of the U.S. giant, with all the consequences that come with it.

Meanwhile, China is already building its own network, actually two, for low Earth orbit broadband satellite connectivity, and Europe has just signed contracts to build Iris2, a public space infrastructure for governments, public entities, and companies, consisting of 292 devices in low and medium orbits. Iris2 will only be an alternative to Starlink for institutional use because, in terms of critical mass, it cannot compete. More importantly, it is set to launch starting in 2029 and become operational in the 2030s. By then, the orbits will be crowded with tens of thousands of Starlink satellites, Kuiper satellites, Chinese satellites, and possibly Indian ones. Will there be enough “space in space” by then? At the pace at which Musk’s businesses evolve, Starlink will likely have a solid direct-to-cell network and unrivaled technology, ahead of the rest of the world by at least a decade.

At the end of December, two weeks before the controversy sparked by the Bloomberg revelation (later denied), it was announced that under the mandate of the Comint, the Italian Space Agency (Asi) will conduct a preliminary feasibility study for a national constellation. But while there is no doubt about the necessity of acquiring “sovereign” infrastructure, whether European or Italian, no one has yet proposed a “futuristic” project or ideas on how to achieve it in an increasingly divided Europe.